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Abstract  
 
This article discusses the dilemmas of humanitarian advocacy in the contemporary 
world. First the article considers the crisis of humanitarianism within the wider crisis 
of meaning in international politics which encouraged humanitarian advocacy. 
Humanitarian advocacy in the last fifteen years has drawn attention to how 
humanitarian crises have been precipitated by state policies and has sought 
international intervention to protect people. Accordingly humanitarian advocacy has 
become associated with challenging the national sovereignty of the developing state. 
However rather than the strong sovereign state lying behind today’s humanitarian 
crises, the article contends that the weak state is the problem. The article suggests 
that the existing humanitarian advocacy paradigm risks legitimising further erosion 
of weak states. Humanitarian advocacy has arguably complimented neoliberal 
economic policies hollowing out the developing state and abandoning national 
development. The article concludes that humanitarian advocacy should prioritise 
reasserting the importance of humanitarian relief without conditionality and how to 
regain humanitarian access on the basis of consent. 
 
Rise of humanitarian advocacy 
 
MSF pioneered contemporary humanitarian advocacy under the motto ‘Care for and 
Testify’, challenging traditional humanitarianism’s reserve. Its award of the Nobel 
Prize in 1999 demonstrates how humanitarian advocacy has been recognised 
internationally. Since the end of the Cold War, humanitarian organisations have not 
simply become more involved in lobbying for greater official aid and campaigning to 
increase private donations (in Band Aid-type appeals), but have sought to intervene 
directly in international politics. MSF humanitarians prominently appealed in the 
Western media for military intervention in Bosnia, and its stance has been adopted 
widely in the humanitarian sector. Officials from Save the Children were among those 
lobbying Western governments to intervene militarily in Kosovo. Save the Children’s 
work has always been underpinned by children’s rights advocacy, but this form of 
advocacy was new. More recently Oxfam, which has defined itself as a development 
organisation since the 1960s, has appealed for more robust responses to the Darfur 
crisis. Oxfam ranks its commitment towards advocacy as equal to its commitment to 
development and emergency relief. Oxfam’s direction indicates how development 
NGOs have taken up more advocacy work and campaigning on human rights. Indeed 
development activities in the rights-based development model increasingly take the 
form of advocacy work. Oxfam has become more closely involved in campaigns such 
as debt relief or international trade reform that previously it might have left to its 
sister organisation Third World First. British aid agencies have come together to 
campaign under banners such as Make Poverty History as well as conducting their 
own advocacy work. MSF is currently prominently involved in a campaign to make 
cheap generic drugs available to developing countries. Furthermore human rights 
organisations such as Amnesty International have also expanded their remit to include 
advocacy over international humanitarian law and begun cooperating with 
humanitarian organisations. Yet again human rights organisations such as the Aegis 
Trust or Genocide Watch have emerged which have primarily an advocacy role and 
do not conduct individual casework. 
 
Humanitarian advocacy was embraced as part of a fresh approach when the crises 
immediately following the Berlin Wall’s collapse cast doubt on traditional 
humanitarianism. Humanitarian advocacy promised to reinvigorate a demoralised 
humanitarian sector and forge new partnerships with populations in the South. The 
new humanitarianism has been preoccupied with the consequences of humanitarian 
aid, but what are the consequences of humanitarian advocacy and its impact on 
traditional relief work? This article discusses problems of humanitarian advocacy in 
an unequal world, drawing upon debates from British humanitarian politics. First the 
article considers the crisis of humanitarianism within the wider crisis of purpose in 
international politics, which encouraged humanitarian advocacy, linking it to the 
West’s own political crisis at the end of the Cold War. Humanitarian advocacy in the 
last fifteen years has drawn attention to how humanitarian crises have been 
precipitated by state policies and has sought international intervention to protect 
people. Accordingly humanitarian advocacy has become associated with challenging 
the national sovereignty of the developing state. However rather than the strong 
sovereign state lying behind today’s humanitarian crises, the article contends that the 
weak state is the problem.  In challenging the authority of the developing state, 
humanitarian advocacy has complimented international politics and economics. First 
humanitarian advocacy has complimented international economic policies hollowing 
out the developing state and abandoning national development, thereby undermining 
the position of developing states within the international system. At the same time 
humanitarian advocacy for military intervention has complimented international 
political developments challenging the sovereign equality of states. Moreover its 
advocacy has encouraged the politicising and militarising of humanitarian aid which 
makes it harder for NGOs to resist the politicising and militarising aid in the war on 
terror. The article suggests that the existing humanitarian advocacy paradigm has 
helped legitimise the reassertion of an unequal international order, while 
compromising humanitarianism itself. 
 
The article then discusses what humanitarian advocacy might be more appropriate in 
the contemporary world to address the injustices manifested in humanitarian crises. 
British NGO advocacy work on poverty, international trade or debt relief continues to 
enjoy a radical reputation and has not caused the same contentions within 
organisations as humanitarian advocacy for military intervention. Yet how 
groundbreaking or useful is this advocacy work? Beneath the headlines of making 
poverty history proposed NGO policies seem to accord with Britain’s official line and 
merely advance aid policies already being contemplated by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Gordon Brown or the Department of International Development. 
Meanwhile humanitarianism’s unique role is being lost. The article concludes that 
humanitarian organisations should focus on securing universal humanitarian relief and 
how to regain humanitarian access on the basis of consent. In a world of unequal 
states, it is vital for advocacy to reassert humanitarianism’s universalism and 
humanitarian relief being provided without political conditions. 
 
International politics of the emergency 
 
Humanitarianism acquired new significance in post-Cold War international relations. 
Aid agencies are already nostalgically looking back at the 1990s as if not a golden age 
for humanitarianism, then an interregnum when ‘the tide was definitely moving in the 
right direction’ (Christian Aid, 2004, p. 2): 
 
Here was a chance for a brave new world. One in which rich countries 
would lift emerging nations out of poverty and help them to stand on their 
own, equal partners on a new, more equal and more prosperous state 
(ibid., p. 10). 
 
The War on Terror is portrayed as extinguishing gains for humanitarianism and 
ushering in a New Cold War, which subordinates humanitarian to security concerns 
(Christian Aid, 2004; Cosgrove, 2004). Yet there is more continuity in international 
politics than aid agencies care to acknowledge, confusing their elevation and presence 
in government policy-making with a progressive international politics. Regrettably 
humanitarianism’s high profile in the 1990s was due less to a flourishing humanism 
than how humanitarian advocacy compliments the contemporary politics of 
emergency (Furedi, 2002; Laidi, 1998). The end of Cold War ideological divisions 
without major international conflict suggested new possibilities for a peaceful global 
order and boosted idealist against Realist accounts of international relations, 
especially in Europe, if not in the United States. Yet its end also revealed profound 
problems in domestic and international politics. Strikingly initial euphoria at the 
West’s triumph over communism quickly gave way to pessimism over the future. 
Premature triumphant declarations of ‘the end of history’ soon rang hollow and came 
to suggest abandonment of grand historical projects instead of their realisation. Indeed 
security analysts were soon referring nostalgically to the Cold War period.  
 
Importantly the demise of Cold War ideological divisions eroded political meaning 
and the legitimacy of public institutions in the West too. Cold War rivalry for 
influence in the developing world had fostered rival political visions of national 
development. A modernist project was galvanised in the West under international 
pressure to produce an alternative to counter the Soviet Union model of progress. This 
exigency also helped give a sense of purpose to Western societies. Consequently the 
loss of the Cold War political framework was experienced as disorientating rather 
than liberating. Progressive politics have fragmented in the West, and the emerging 
political discourse exhibits disenchantment with mass politics and universalist visions. 
Western politicians have struggled to identify sources of meaning and common values 
around which to cohere their societies. In the elusive search for meaning, the relativist 
age has found the Holocaust or contemporary catastrophes to be almost the only 
remaining moral absolutes against which it can define itself. Western societies 
increasingly only seem to come together today in tragedy whether the sentimental 
mourning of Princess Diana in Britain or the public responses in Belgium against the 
paedophile killer Marc Dutroux. This problem is repeated at a local level where 
British city councils such as Nottingham have sought to reconnect to the public and 
recreate a civic ethos based on outrage against violent killings. The lowest common 
denominator definition of the good citizen as ‘not a violent killer’ or ‘not a 
paedophile’ reveals the exhaustion of progressive politics and how civic life is being 
reorganised around insecurity as opposed to a positive visions of the future. 
 
Political disorientation has intensified feelings of vulnerability and risk consciousness, 
which creates urgency that ‘something must be done’ but responses lack the 
coherence derived from a larger vision (Furedi, 2002). The demise of grand historical 
projects has truncated political vision and encouraged short-term policy-making. 
Politics resembles crisis management as politicians erratically lurch from one issue to 
another as they seek to project a sense of purpose through action, that is, the politics 
of emergency (Laidi, 1998). So even before the World Trade Centre attack, Western 
politics was becoming subsumed into a security paradigm informed by heightened 
risk consciousness.  
 
Humanitarian emergencies have resonated in the Western imagination over the last 
decade because they are symptoms not only of the failure of past political projects but 
today’s politics that finds it difficult to do more than manage the present (ibid.). A 
disenchanted polity has an opportunity to feel engaged and vicariously vent their 
existential anxieties in the elemental struggle for survival that the humanitarian 
emergency throws up. Moreover the politicising of the humanitarian emergency 
transforms it into a modern morality play for Western audiences. Victims and villains 
are identified and elusive moral certainties are found in the absolutes of life and death. 
Finding catharsis in somebody else’s emergency, the writer Dubravka Ugresic wryly 
observes, was the Bosnian conflict’s attraction for so many Europeans (Ugresic, 
1998). While those populations cast as villains have found their plight eschewed in 
international humanitarian circles as well as international politics (Fox, 2001). So 
even before the War on Terrorism was declared, the principle of neutrality was being 
abandoned by humanitarian officials in New Humanitarianism movement. 
Subsequently aid agencies have warned about the dangers of Bush’s absolutism – that 
you are either with us or against us in the war on terror. But aid agencies overlook 
their own growing political absolutism in their readiness to apply the term genocide to 
a growing variety of conflicts such as the Dafur conflict in Sudan to support their 
demand for international intervention. These increased declarations of genocide draw 
attention to the scale of human suffering and underscore demands for something to be 
done, but are not necessarily helpful in understanding the character of a particular 
conflict and the political demands of the protagonists or formulating policies to 
address them. The readiness to invoke genocide effectively represents aid agencies’ 
own form of declaring you are either with us or against us by labelling potential 
critics of intervention apologists. 
 
So once again, even before the War on Terrorism was declared, the principle of 
universalism some populations found themselves . The 1990s had their own 
absolutism 
 
Western sustainable development advocacy, national development’s demise 
 
The politics of emergency has had serious consequences for the developing world. An 
important aspect of today’s truncated political vision is the low horizons it offers for 
the developing world, which can only increase the chances of humanitarian 
emergencies occurring. Developing countries have long found themselves caught 
between the inadequacies of the market and international development policies. The 
Cold War promises of national development were not realised. From independence, 
developing countries found it difficult to secure capital investment to industrialise 
their economies except if they were considered vital to the west’s security interests. 
International development aid did not sufficiently compensate for the lack of capital 
investment and emphasised expert advice and training over capital investment 
(Galbraith, 1964). Moreover international development policy has always been 
conditioned by the international security climate. Western policy-makers arguably 
only embraced a modernisation agenda for the developing world as part of its 
strategies to contain the influence of the Soviet Union. From the inception of 
international development, Western thinking was ambivalent towards the 
industrialisation of developing countries. The policy literature speculated whether 
cultural change was needed before economic development could take off and whether 
industrial development was even appropriate, fearing it could destabilise societies and 
promote political radicalism with broader consequences for international peace and 
security (Pupavac, 2005, forthcoming). Western scepticism became more pronounced 
as Third World nationalism receded and international pressure to counter the Soviet 
Union eased. Since the end of the Cold War the national development of developing 
countries to the level of industrialised countries is simply not even an aspiration, let 
alone a prospect. International development policy today is substantially concerned 
with changing countries’ cultures as the means (and meaning) of social progress. 
 
The retreat from national development in official Western policy has been 
complimented by non-governmental development thinking. Indeed the very expansion 
of the international NGO development sector embodied Western scepticism towards 
the industrialisation of the South and developing states. If earlier underdevelopment 
theories were critical of international development policies for reinforcing 
international inequalities, they nevertheless saw alternative modernisation models as 
essential for developing countries to enjoy more equal relations with the advanced 
industrial nations. Conversely contemporary development thinking is essentially anti-
development, that is, it does not want to industrialise, but enhance individuals and 
communities’ existing means of survival. Its thinking is embodied in the much quoted 
maxim ‘Feed a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you 
feed him for life.’ The maxim has been repeatedly invoked since it was used back in 
1960 by the UN Campaign Against Hunger. Technological progress carries negative 
connotations in NGO development circles, breaking the assumption of earlier 
development models, whether capitalist or socialist, which linked social progress with 
material and technical advancement. Low or intermediate technology is considered 
appropriate; the automation of production inappropriate.  
 
The anti-development position of NGO thinking has long antecedents in Western 
Romanticism’s hostility towards industrialisation expressed in the works of figures 
such as William Blake or William Morris. More specifically anti-developmentalism 
has been influenced by Western anthropological perspectives, which in turn informed 
colonial administration. Leading twentieth century anthropologists were partly 
inspired by their doubts about their own societies, notably their concern with the 
alienating consequences of modernity, and a desire to find alternative ways of life 
which would support their progressive reform agenda at home by demonstrating the 
possibility of different ways of organising society. Anthropological thinking therefore 
considered it important to preserve the pluralism of cultures, because they thought 
traditional communities could provide insights for modern society. Their work often 
expressed alarm at how contact with modernity was destabilising the societies they 
studied. Hence anthropologists had serious reservations about international 
development policy seeking to transform the developing world on the lines of the 
advanced industrialised societies. Concerns over modernity’s destabilising impact on 
traditional societies were taken up colonial administrators and shaped colonial 
thinking on development. 
 
The earlier anthropological critique of modernisation strategies was reinforced by the 
counterculture critique of mass society that influenced radical politics in the 1960s 
and 1970s as it grappled with its failures. In trying to understand why the masses did 
not embrace radical politics, critics suggested that modern consumerism anaesthetised 
people and created conformists, inhibiting political radicalism (Marcuse, 1964). 
Political radicalism could only emerge from those outside the processes of the modern 
industrial state; therefore radicalism should be opposed to the idea of developing 
countries becoming modern industrial states like their own. Equally radicals were less 
and less enamoured by the communist model with the Soviet Union’s suppression of 
dissent in Eastern Europe. State sovereignty was associated not with national 
independence struggles but with violence, whether the two superpowers’ military 
interventions around the globe or their support for military regimes in the developing 
world. The counterculture critique idealised an authentic life of peasant farmers and 
independent artisans producing traditional crafts as still existing in parts of the 
developing world, but being crushed by development. This vision was further 
supported by the rise of environmentalism within Western thought expressed in books 
such as Rachel Carson’s influential Silent Spring (1962), which condemned 
industrialisation as destroying the planet’s resources. Its holistic vision wanted to 
minimise humanity’s imprint on the planet and return to a simpler way of life, which 
balanced human needs against the needs of the environment. Environmentalist 
perspectives were absorbed into the anti-modernisation critique as it became codified 
into the concept of sustainable development. 
 
Growing scepticism towards modernisation among Western policy-makers was 
captured in E. F. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful, which became the bible of the 
sustainable development model. Its publication during the 1970s oil crisis, which 
suggested to Western states how developing countries could challenge their access to 
cheap raw materials, secured Schumacher’s arguments a large hearing. Schumacher 
argued that modernisation policies were damaging communities and livelihoods, and 
promoting greed and frustration, and were therefore counter to international peace and 
security. Development strategies should reject industrialisation and universal 
prosperity as a goal and concentrate on fulfilling basic needs, maintaining traditional 
communities and livelihoods by disseminating low technological solutions. In this 
vein, the recent Africa Commission states, ‘Emphasis is placed on agricultural and 
rural development, as well as the need to deal with the challenge of rapid 
urbanisation’ (Africa Commission, chapter 7, p. 2). 
 So while proponents of sustainable development readily condemn the past 
modernisation model as a western imposition, they are reluctant to acknowledge how 
their anti-modernisation arguments are no less a western import reflecting a long 
tradition of Western relativism, with strong antecedents in colonial development 
thinking. Conversely, while developing countries were often critical of the earlier 
international development programmes, this did not mean they were anti-development 
or favoured the new basic needs approach. Initiatives such as the 1974 UN 
Declaration on a New International Economic Order reveal that the developing states 
were demanding advanced technology to industrialise, along with equitable 
international terms of trade, as vital to become equals with developed states. Tellingly 
it was developing countries, notably the least developed countries, which championed 
the right to development in the 1980s against the growing anti-developmentalism in 
Western development circles.  
 
Ironically, Western radical thinking therefore has come to share official scepticism 
towards industrialisation, although coming from opposing positions. Consider how 
small-scale non-wage production is championed as less exploitative than large-scale 
production and spreading ownership of the means of production (Sen, 1975). 
Previously the problem of ownership in large-scale production was seen as 
addressable through policies such as nationalisation or other forms of social 
ownership. Such solutions, however, no longer enjoy much support in development 
thinking, not only because of political, social and environmental questioning of 
industrialisation. The coinciding shift from Keynsian to neoliberal economics in 
Western economic policy in the 1980s championed the small state and opposed state 
intervention and state aid as creating dependency. The anti-state solutions such as 
micro-credit schemes offered by the retrenched sustainable development agenda have 
effectively complimented rather than challenged the anti-state agenda propounded by 
official donors.  
 
The sustainable development model makes a virtue of people having to create their 
own employment opportunities to support themselves in the face of structural 
adjustment reforms cutting state welfare and public employment. NGOs talk in terms 
of promoting ‘sustainable livelihoods’, ‘poor in markets’ and how ‘Corruption and the 
abuse of power prevent the benefits of free trade, privatisation and political change 
reaching the poorest’ (Oxfam, *). The theme of empowering people with the skills 
and confidence to start up their own micro-enterprises chimes with the ideology of 
neoliberal economics. As Mark Duffield observes, ‘Sustainable development shifts 
the responsibility for self-reproduction from states to people reconfigured as social 
entrepreneurs operating at the level of the household and communities’ (Duffield, 
2005, forthcoming). In this vein, the recent Africa Commission aims to ‘empower 
poor people to shape their own lives, including by investing in their health and 
education…’ and emphasises the need ‘to foster small enterprises’ (Africa 
Commission, 2005, chapter 7, p. 2). A key aim Similarly Christian Aid’s home page, 
for example, declares how it ‘believes in strengthening people to find their own 
solutions to the problems they face’. While Oxfam speaks of people coming together 
across the world ‘To end poverty for themselves, for others, for each other’ (Oxfam, 
2003/4). So in the name of not being patronising or imposing, people have to fend for 
themselves. It is essentially a containment strategy  
 
At its best, prioritising basic needs such as UNICEF’s GOBI programmes have had 
significant success in improving infant survival rates despite the worsening economic 
situation in many developing countries. Yet however impressive these programmes 
are as lifelines for populations in precarious circumstances, it would be a misnomer to 
describe them as development or poverty eradication. Overall the sustainable 
development model leaves most of the world’s population in poverty relying on 
household production, their lives dominated by the forces of nature, and very exposed 
without the safety nets that citizens of post-industrial states expect. Nevertheless, 
proponents of sustainable development have not wanted to abandon efforts to promote 
social improvement, even as their basic needs approach seeks to lower people’s 
material expectations. Consider the Millennium Development Goals project, which 
claims to be ‘an expanded vision of development’, but expects states without having 
advanced materially to realise its normative agenda in 2015 including universal 
primary education and gender equality. For its vision makes changing culture and 
individual behaviour the primary means of social advancement in its idea of 
‘vigorously [promoting] human development as the key to sustaining social and 
economic progress’. In effect, they expect pre-industrial societies to adopt post-
industrial norms, while based on enhanced tradition household production and 
eschewing the material comforts enjoyed by post-industrial societies. However, the 
demise of the national development drive is not returning countries to simple holistic 
life in harmony with nature, but is brutal and competitive. Crucially the sustainable 
development model does not address the limited capacity of the developing state, 
which can hardly be transformed into a progressive redistributive state guaranteeing 
its citizens’ welfare without a developed economy and infrastructure. In so far as the 
problem of the weak state is belatedly being recognised by official donors or NGOs, 
the problem of the weak state is moralised in terms of corruption or bad governance. 
The material conditions underlying the weak illiberal state are side-stepped. 
 
Reluctance to address contradictions in the sustainable development model relates to 
antipathy towards the modern industrial state, associating it with violence and 
injustice, and expectations of populations’ self-reliance, material restraint and lower 
expectations. Somehow a benign, understanding, liberal, decentralised state is 
presumed possible when people are competing for survival. However the reality of a 
society organised around small scale family producers, pastoralists and strong 
communal or kinship ties is likely only to be able to support a precarious state with a 
weak relationship to the population and characterised by a nepotistic public sphere. 
What does advocacy for free public education and health care mean in the absence of 
national development? Even if this advocacy were to succeed, leaving aside welfare 
distribution problems without a developed infrastructure, such advocacy can only 
aspire to basic health care and basic education.  
 
At the same time, the sustainable development model makes inequality between 
developing and developed countries an indefinite condition. Namely, abandoning the 
technological advancement of developing countries essentially means abandoning the 
advancement of equality between developing and developed states. These problems 
have not registered properly with international development advocates despite the 
disquiet expressed by developing countries towards the lowering of their prospects 
implied by the basic needs approach. Western anti-poverty campaigns such as Making 
Poverty History should be considered in this light. The campaigns are informed by a 
development model that does not aspire to universal prosperity and has redefined 
poverty eradication in terms of managing survival through better self-reliance. 
Consider NGO debt relief advocacy, which has previously accepted the need for 
conditionality, although against conditions requiring public welfare cuts. More 
recently where debt forgiveness without conditions is formally advocated, 
conditionality seems to reappear informally. But NGOs are typically only cautiously 
demanding Western states increase debt forgiveness or ‘cancel unpayable debt’, while 
assuming the need for increased international supervision of indebted countries to root 
out corruption and ensure that government spending is organised around basic needs, 
rather than on defence, advanced technology and so on. So basic community health 
care spending is approved, but spending on high-tech hospitals is suspect as an 
inefficient use of resources. NGO advocacy envisages people in developing countries 
not adopting consumerist Western lifestyles, but retaining their more authentic simple 
ways of life, or more bluntly, they are envisaged as having a lower standard of living. 
Similarly too much fair trade advocacy assumes people in developing countries 
engaged in appropriately low or medium technology in micro-enterprises as opposed 
to large-scale automated production. Implicitly, in so far as developing countries are 
envisaged as trading in international markets it is based on unequal means of 
production, presumably through a rather paternalistic relationship with ethnical 
Western multinational companies like the Body Shop or NGO shops. Moreover 
proposed fair trade conditions, like microcredit conditionality, also presume the right 
to dictate extra-financial terms based on the sustainable development vision of the 
ethical life. 
 
The sustainable development doctrine originally evaded the political consequences of 
making inequality an indefinite feature of the international system, but advocates of 
the human security model which was elaborated in the 1990s are plainly abandoning 
the principle of sovereign equality. Ironically then the anti-development critique, 
despite its avowed antipathy towards modern industrial states, now endorses in the 
human security model those very states having greater powers against developing 
countries. The assumptions of the human security model belie the idea that the 1990s 
offered developing countries the chance to become ‘equal partners on a new, more 
equal and more prosperous stage’ (Christian Aid, 2004, p. 10).  
 
Human security advocacy and international equality 
 
If the sustainable development model complimented the anti-state neoliberal 
economic policies, the human security model, which evolved in the 1990s, assumed 
the failing capacity of developing states to protect their populations and the necessity 
of reordering international relations to deal with this reality. The UN Charter 1945 
established a collective self-policing international system underpinned by the 
principles of national sovereignty and sovereign equality between states. Each state is 
presumed to represent the interests of its own people and have the capacity to 
guarantee its own security. Interference in the internal affairs of states is outlawed in 
the Charter. Thus the viability of the international security system has been dependent 
on developing the newly independent states. The newly independent states looked 
forward to securing their capacity in the early heady days of international 
development, but incapacity has become an indefinite condition for many states in 
international development’s demise, weakening the possibility of their being equal 
subjects internationally or moral agents domestically securing their population’s 
welfare. Furthermore the collective self-policing security model is made untenable.  
 The concept of human development as distinct from national development has 
captured the imagination of the demoralised international development community, 
while the associated concept of human security relates to enforcement and harnessing 
the higher priority (and resources) given to security by Western policy-makers (King 
and Murray, 2001-2002; Mack, 2004). Against the presumptions of the Charter, the 
concept of human security highlights that states may fail to secure the interests of 
their population and that states too often violate individuals’ security. Canada and 
Japan as donor countries have been prominently involved in elaborating the concept, 
Canada primarily in relation to humanitarian intervention and Japan primarily in 
relation to its development aspects. The UNDP within the UN system has been most 
closely associated with promoting the concepts, notably in conjunction with its human 
development index of basic needs and rights, which ranks countries in accordance 
with their compliance. Despite wide appeal in development circles, the concepts have 
been criticised as rhetorically attractive but of limited practicability for populations 
(King and Murray, 2001-2002; Mack, 2004). This is unsurprising given 
development’s anti-materialist turn and its expectations of self-reliance.  
 
Predictably human development rankings categorise many developing countries as 
widely failing their populations while categorising the advanced industrial countries 
as generally securing their populations’ welfare. Yet the human development index 
was inspired by the desire to demonstrate that social progress is possible without 
material advancement. A broad correlation between per capita income and ranking is 
consciously contested in the human development literature, and cases countering this 
linkage emphasised, although the commonly cited examples of China and Cuba might 
suggest rather different conclusions being drawn from the sustainable development 
model championed by the human development literature! Developing countries find 
themselves caught between the contradictions of an anti-materialist development 
outlook and idealist accounts of international relations. Importantly for low ranking 
developing countries, there has been a tendency to interpret states’ rankings as moral 
rankings, rather than material rankings. Accordingly human security scales are used to 
distinguish unethical states, which violate their population’s security, and responsible 
states, which provide human security. Human security enforcement strategies entrust 
the international community of responsible states to intervene in violating states on 
the behalf of vulnerable populations. Thus the human security model essentially 
challenges developing countries’ legitimacy and enhances the legitimacy of Western 
powers to intervene around the world, undermining the principle of sovereign equality 
between states. 
 
Intervention is positively endorsed in the human security model contrary to the UN 
Charter. The Charter’s prohibition was based on fears of its potential abuse by 
powerful states. Tellingly discussions over the human security model have neglected 
the potential conflict of interest between intervening states and the populations of 
developing states, or indeed between Western NGOs and the populations of 
developing countries. This neglect is striking given how the concept of human 
security pointedly draws attention to the conflict of interests between a state and its 
population. NGOs talk of their international relations in terms of belonging to an 
intimate global community as if we are living in one big inclusive extended village, 
where people enjoy an equal voice and mutual ties of accountability, where wealth 
does not matter, and individuals in the South can just pop along to their neighbours in 
the North. In this vein, Oxfam talks of its ‘interconnectedness’:  
 
Oxfam is a world wide network. A community that’s crossing continents. 
Linking villages, towns, countries. Connecting individuals who live 
thousands of miles apart. And from Bangalore to Bolton, from Tokyo to 
Tajikistan, this community is changing lives. People across the world are 
coming together with a shared goal (Oxfam, 2003/4).  
  
A direct disinterested relationship is being assumed by NGOs by-passing the 
developing state where NGOs place themselves as voicing the interests of people in 
developing countries rather than their delegitimised governments. The unequal 
distribution of power in this relationship is unacknowledged. In the unequal 
relationship, NGOs are political gatekeepers, determining which voices in the 
developing world they will represent, how their problems are represented and 
addressed, along with their implied role as economic gatekeepers in fair trade or debt 
relief. The possibility that NGOs might be drawn to certain voices that echo their 
thinking is overlooked.   
 
Meanwhile official policy-making is taking for granted the acceptability of 
intervention to aid organisations, including military enforcement, and talking about 
mechanisms for more efficient coordination between Western governments and non-
governmental organisations in global governance. That intervening states and 
humanitarian organisations may have conflicting objectives is disregarded. Such is the 
acceptability that Western governments have frequently found themselves criticised 
by aid organisations for not intervening enough in crises around the world, even 
following the controversial military invasion and occupation of Iraq. Moreover 
humanitarian war was a concept that humanitarian organisations helped legitimise in 
their demands for military enforcement in the Balkans during the 1990s. The collapse 
of humanitarian space in Iraq caused serious disquiet, because humanitarians were 
identified with the Western military forces as legitimate targets, but has not prevented 
various humanitarian and human rights organisations demanding more robust 
intervention elsewhere since then, including interventions by-passing the UN Security 
Council. Thus in November 2004, an Oxfam press release declared that, ‘The 
European Union must step in to the void left by the UN Security Council’s failure, 
and take action to stop the violence in Dafur’ (Oxfam, 2004).  
 
Western governments can happily live with criticism endorsing them having a greater 
role. The moralisation of human insecurity in developing countries has provided 
something against which Western states can define themselves, while the 
endorsement of humanitarian enforcement has given them a flexible foreign policy 
tool. When the weapons of mass destruction grounds for the invasion of Iraq proved 
shaky, the British government invoked the humanitarian card. Politicians over the last 
decade have frequently observed they cannot intervene everywhere, but the idea that 
they should be intervening has boosted their weakened sense of purpose and helped 
them manage their crisis of legitimacy at home. They have at least been able to take a 
moral stand and point to violations of peoples’ security in the developing world, even 
if they have found it difficult to identify common values at home.  
 
The problem of human security in developing countries is real. However the demand 
to erode international equality between states and expand Western governance of 
other countries is an alarming antidemocratic conclusion to draw which reverses the 
political progress made in the international system during the twentieth century and 
resurrects the idea of liberal imperialism. Indicatively the human security model only 
proposes third class social justice for populations in developing countries. If we 
consider the experience of Bosnia as perhaps the best, most comprehensive case of 
governance beyond borders. Yet after a decade of international administration, there 
is over forty percent unemployment, and the public welfare system is being reduced, 
not expanded. The population is expected increasingly to create its own employment 
through micro-enterprise and provide its own welfare through private insurance. 
Interestingly, post-conflict economy recovery in Bosnia under international 
administration has been much weaker today than after the Second World War. 
Meanwhile international administrators seem much happier elaborating social policies 
which are susceptible to moralising or bureaucratic target-setting such as quotas as 
opposed to policies capable of generating real changes in the political, social and 
economic prospects of the population.  
 
Within international humanitarian work, there is an evident growing preference for 
moral advocacy over material aid as its efforts have been criticised for creating 
dependency or feeding killers. Consider how the two UN ad hoc tribunals for former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda (the former much more than the latter) swallowed up twenty 
percent of the UN’s funds at the height of their funding, whose main beneficiaries 
have been human rights advocates and other professionals (like me!) rather than the 
victims themselves. This pattern is being repeated at different levels, encapsulated 
more recently for me at a meeting on the Dafur crisis. The UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator Mukesh Kapila was highly animated in his address about how the 
international community should be prosecuting war crimes, leaving less time to 
devote to the pressing humanitarian aid needs of refugees. The conscious or 
unconscious priorities made in his address may seem a trivial matter to draw attention 
to but they illustrate how humanitarian advocacy is becoming skewed. The 
consequences of this skewed advocacy can be seen in the perversity of the UN 
warning that food rations may have to be cut in the refugee camps to levels below 
caloric requirements in the same month it announces the International Criminal Court 
is taking up the Dafur case. The discrepancy in resources suggests the international 
community is keener to take a moral stand on Dafur than properly feed the very 
refugees whose suffering it is invoking. 
 
The degree of international commitment and sustained efforts to provide security and 
create a viable state in Bosnia is probably exceptional rather than rule. More striking 
is the rather arbitrary, superficial and short-termist character of foreign interventions, 
which do not seem to be based on a rational analysis of security risks or evident plans 
of what to do once intervention has been initiated. The interventions create much 
sound and fury (shock and awe), but to what end is vague. Policy is made on the hoof.  
Meanwhile the humanitarian intervention advocacy literature has been dominated by 
the right to intervene military but has had relatively little to say about what happens 
after intervention. In the words of Zaki Laidi, there is a desire to project moral and 
military authority in the absence of a clear political project (Laidi, 1998). 
Consequently today’s interventions are not evolving into the same formal or 
embedded relationships between ruler and ruled of liberal imperialism past. Phrases 
such as ‘empire-lite’ (Ignatieff, 2003) or the more damning ‘hyper-active attention 
deficit disorder’ (Ferguson, 2004) are being applied. The informal interventions of 
non-governmental organisations are proving to be a useful compliant mechanism in 
today’s ad hoc global engagements. 
 
Humanitarian advocacy’s direction? 
 
The relegitimising of international inequality between states and the informal political 
role being delegated to non-governmental organisations in governance beyond 
borders creates serious problems for humanitarian advocacy. It is too easy for aid 
agencies to become cheerleaders for Western posturing over the state of the 
developing world. Despite the extensive soul-searching in the 1990s, the humanitarian 
sector as a whole still underestimates the ramifications of this reordering for 
humanitarian work. Interestingly one of the strongest recent warnings on the dangers 
of humanitarianism becoming dangerously entangled with Western foreign military 
missions comes from the research director of the MSF-Foundation, considering MSF 
pioneered today’s politicised humanitarian advocacy (Weissman, 2005). Fabrice 
Weissman’s report pointedly observes humanitarians’ endorsement of the concept of 
humanitarian war has compromised humanitarianism’s meaning. He argues that 
humanitarian organisations must therefore bear some responsibility for becoming 
targets and being unable to work in places like Iraq or Afghanistan. In the light of 
NGOs demanding intervention in Dafur, Weissman asks: 
 
After the Iraqi and Afghan populations, will the Sudanese people on the 
wrong side of the front line become the newest victims, abandoned by 
humanitarian organizations forced to evacuate the country after their 
symbol has been militarized (ibid.).  
 
If MSF has found itself burnt by being too closely associated with Western foreign 
adventures, other humanitarian or human rights organisations are less wary. Least 
wary of all in advocating military interventions in the name of humanitarianism are 
probably newer human rights organisations such as the Aegis Trust who, not being 
engaged in relief work, do not have to face the consequences of their stance on the 
ground. If they worry about too close an identification of contemporary military 
humanitarianism with past imperialism, they try to square this with the idea of ground 
troops coming from non-Western countries. But such niceties actually echo past 
colonial strategies of ‘getting savages to fight barbarians’ (Duffield, 2005 
forthcoming). 
 
Generally, in so far as a consciousness of a changed climate is expressed, the changed 
climate is too easily put down to the War on Terror as if humanitarian advocacy could 
continue as usual if only Western governments did not lead their security priorities to 
divert aid from humanitarian concerns. The humanitarian organisations have been 
slow to acknowledge properly how their own political advocacy has facilitated this 
reordering and undermining of the UN Charter, despite the compelling research 
produced by individual NGO staff on the political, social and ethical problems thrown 
up by humanitarian enforcement. Inconsistently NGOs have criticised the failure to 
get a prior UN Security Council resolution authorising military intervention in Iraq, 
although they have previously and subsequently testified to their willingness to 
dispense this requirement of international law in demanding military intervention in 
Kosovo or Dafur in the name of humanitarianism. Evidently the practical 
consequences for individual humanitarian missions such as the collapse of 
humanitarian space in Iraq have registered more than the broad ethical dilemmas 
raised by the concept of humanitarian enforcement. Furthermore the huge response to 
the Asian Tsunami has reinforced complacency that humanitarianism will be all right 
after all and dampened the impact of some insightful reflections on humanitarianism’s 
future. 
 
There is a final more general observation I want to make on the growth of 
humanitarian advocacy, which requires more reflection. Tony Vaux provocatively 
entitled his book The Selfish Altruist. Perhaps today we should speak of the 
narcissistic altruist. Namely that today’s preference for advocacy is not unrelated to 
today’s narcissistic cult of publicity. There exists a long-standing idea in philosophy 
that for charitable acts to be truly virtuous and not vanity they should be secret. These 
ancient strictures may be harsh and impracticable (how would an organisation raise 
funds for its aid programmes?), but I highlight them because today’s desire to be seen 
to be doing something in high profile emergencies such as the Asian Tsunami is 
skewing aid priorities and undermining the principle of universalism. The temptations 
of advocacy over ordinary aid relief are evident when the latter has been attacked for 
damaging economies and feeding killers. Advocacy directly elevates an organisation’s 
profile in a manner that ordinary aid provision does not. In advocacy one can claim 
the moral high ground without the hassles and responsibilities of implementing 
policy. Nor does one have to deal with any contradictions of policies in practice.  
 
Moreover the distinction between doing good and being seen being good is being lost 
in today’s campaigning which too often only seems focused on mobilising the latter. 
Its style flatters individuals that they are changing the world through trivial gestures. 
‘It only needs to take you a matter of minutes every month, but it will help us to 
literally change the world’, states the Make Poverty History campaign web site in its 
white wristband initiative. 
By wearing one you are part of a unique worldwide effort in 2005 to end 
extreme poverty - you're saying that it's time to stop the deaths of more 
than 200,000 people every single week from preventable diseases (ibid.). 
 
The noughties’ wristbands favoured in various campaigns (displacing the badges 
favoured in the 1980s or the ribbons of the 1990s) epitomises the trivial fashion 
statement masquerading as commitment. Historically items of clothing have often 
been used to symbolise one’s allegiance to a particular political, religious or moral 
cause. However today the symbolic gesture has become the action itself and emptying 
it of any meaning. Wearers essentially draw attention to their own morality, without 
having to commit themselves to anything beyond the gesture. Indicatively, the web 
site states, ‘Wearing the White Band in 2005 is about sending a message that you 
want poverty to be stopped. You can wear it any way you like.. The really important 
thing is that you just wear it.’ Revealingly the emphasis is revealing on you and 
showing  and you demanding something must be done, ‘The important thing is that 
you show your support and say enough is enough.’ This lowest common denominator 
politics also belies the image that NGOs have created a vibrant mass movement 
behind their activities.  
 
What humanitarian work or advocacy is appropriate for the 21st century to address 
injustices in humanitarian crises and make humanitarian crises less likely? This article 
has criticised the focus of much existing humanitarian advocacy as tending to 
reinforce international inequalities instead of overturning them. Insecurity is an 
inevitable condition for most people in developing countries because their weak states 
without a developed economy and infrastructure will lack the capacity to guarantee 
their welfare and rights, whatever their political hue and whatever the level of 
international supervision. Ultimately humanitarianism is concerned with affirming a 
universal humanity and recognising the humanity of every individual. International 
inequalities make humanitarian relief necessary, but difficult to get right. Premature 
declarations of belonging to a global community cloud the reality of unequal 
relations. While moralising the conditions in the developing world is reinforcing 
international inequalities, with dubious results for those in whose name the advocacy 
is conducted. In striving to affirm a universal humanity today, humanitarian advocacy 
should prioritise reasserting the importance of humanitarian relief without 
conditionality and how to regain humanitarian access on the basis of consent. 
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